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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VICTORIA L. BUYERS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16160

DANNY G. BUYERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff-respondent, Victoria L. Buyers, filed a
Verified Petition to Modify a Divorce Decree.

The defendant-

appellant, Danny G. Buyers, filed an Answer to that Petition
and filed a Motion to Set Visitation Privileges with the
parties' minor child.

The issues thus joined were heard by

the Court's Domestic Relations Division.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court defined Mr. Buyers' visitation privileges,
which issues are not on appeal.

It also modified, or by

respondent's view interpreted, a divorce decree to accellerate
by approximately one year a stipulated Court Order to increase
child support, without an allegation or showing of a material
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change of circumstance.

The Court also retroactively

applied this ruling and awarded a Judgment for back
support.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the Order of
the Lower Court amending the Decree of Divorce and the
Judgment for "delinquent support," based on the retroactive
application of that Amendment to the Decree of Divorce.
STATR~ENT

OF FACTS

In viewing the facts in a light most favorable for the
prevailing party below, they demonstrate the following:
1.

The parties to this litigation were heretofore inter-

married, but divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce dated
April 9, 1976.
2.

(R-16).

The aforestated Decree of Divorce was entered into

pursuant to a Property Settlement Agreement, Stipulation and
Waiver prepared by the plaintiff-respondent's (Mrs. Buyers')
attorney.

(R-10-12).

This Stipulation was executed by

the defendant-appellant, Danny G. Buyers on or about
March 9, 1976, while he was unrepresented by counsel.

The

Stipulation was entered into without the advice of counsel
by Mr. Buyers because of his lack of funds and because he
and his wife had reached an agreement as to an equitable
division of their meager assets.
3.

(R-10-12; R-71)).

With reference to the matters in controversary, the

Stipulation provided that Mr. Buyers would pay $50.00 per
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Thereafter, he would pay the sum of $20.00 per month cash as
child support, plus make the payments of approximately
$86.36 due on a 1975 Toyota automobile, which vehicle was
awarded to Mrs. Buyers.

In addition thereto, the defendant

was also required to keep in full force and effect automobile insurance for the estimated three and one-half years
it would take to liquidate the loan.

(R-10, 11; cf. Decree

of Divorce at R-20).
4.

The defendant-appellant was also required to assume

and pay all the outstanding debts and obligations incurred by
the parties to the date of the filing of the Complaint, including the debts of the Salt Lake City Firemen's Credit
Union, the Salt Lake City Employment Credit Union and
others.
5.

(See Stipulation, R-11 and Decree of Divorce R-20).
The defendant-appellant, Mr. Buyers, maintained the

insurance policy on the car as per the Stipulation and Decree.
In addition, he kept current the obligation on the automobile
loan which was scheduled for final liquidation approximately
in May 1979.

This final payoff date was approximately

three years and one month after the entry of the Decree of
Divorce and three years, two months from the date the Stipulation was executed by Mr. Buyers.

(R-70, 74, 75; cf. De-

cree of Divorce and Stipulation at R-10, 12).
6.

The Court entered an Order modifying the Decree of

Divorce and awarded the plaintiff-respondent, Mrs. Buyers,
a back judgment of $400.00 by ruling that the car had been
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paid off on May 1, 1978.

It also ruled that to the date

of the Hearing, the defendant-respondent owed an increased
sum of support.

(R-30).

The Court, further, ordered the

defendant to pay, subsequent to the hearing, the sum of
$100.00 per month.
7.

(R-30).

The said Order was made without there being any

allegation in the Petition for the Hearing that there had
been a material change of circumstance or any factual
demonstration that there had been such a material change
of circumstance to justify the modification of the previous
Stipulation and Decree of Divorce.

(R-1 through 82).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE EXISTS NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE FOR THE COURT TO
ENTER A FINDING THAT THE INTENT OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
WAS TO HAVE THE CAR LOAN A!1.."10RTIZED OVER A PERIOD OF T\vO
YEARS, CONTRARY TO ITS EXPRESS PROVISIONS.
FURTHER, THERE
WERE NO CREDIBLE FACTS TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE LOAN OBLIGATIONS HAD BEEN PAID AS OF MAY 1978.
The facts are undisputed that these parties entered into
a Stipulation concerning support and a division of their
assets.

(See Findings of Fact 2 and 3).

Further, it is

not in dispute that Mr. Buyers did not obtain the services
of an attorney; rather, he relied on the draftsmanship
of Mrs. Buyers' attorney because of his poverty.

The un-

rebutted testimony concerning this point is as follows:
"(Buyers)
It's just that simple.
I
went to her lawyer's office with her and
we discussed several things, and this is
Sponsored by the S.J.the
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"Q.
(Cutler)
But your understanding
when you talked to the lawyer was that
you were going to pay off the full debt
on the Toyota?

"A.

(Buyers)

That's right.

"Q.

(Cutler)

Is that correct?

"A.
(Buyers)
That is what it says in the
Decree, yes, Sir.
I would pay off, and then
at that time, at the end of the pay off time,
then the child support would be $100.00 per
month, which I agreed to.
"Q.
(Cutler)
And which you assumed would
be the pay-out of that loan, about three and
one-half years later, is that correct?

"A.
(Buyers)
Right.
And since that time,
like it says in the record, I have only
added (to the car loan) $100.00.
So I figured
that would be a month.
So I would be more than
happy to pay (the increased child support payments at the end of the car loan).
A month
before it (the loan ammortization date) expired.
"Q.
(Cutler)
When will this loan be paid off
by your computation?

"A.

(Buyers)

May 1979 according to the record.

(R-70).

Thus, it is clear that it was the plaintiff-respondent,
Mrs. Buyers' lawyer who prepared the Stipulation, Findings
of Fact and Decree of Divorce.

It was her lawyer that

computed the approximately three and one-half year pay-out
on the car loan mentioned in that Agreement and Decree.
That Decree specifically provides that Mr. Buyers would
pay $50.00 per month as child support through the month of
July 1976.

Thereafter the defendant was to pay the plain-

tiff's automobile insurance, pay the sum of $86.36 on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1975 Toyota automobile awarded Mrs. Buyers and keep
the insurance in effect during that period.

In addition,

he was to pay $20.00 cash per month child support.

The

Decree adopted by the Court, pursuant to the Stipulation
prepared by Mrs. Buyers' attorney, specifically provided:
"The defendant is ordered to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of $50.00 per month
child support through and including the
month of July 1976, and thereafter to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of $20.00 per
month as child support, and is further
ordered to make payments in the approximate
sum of $86.36 on the 1975 Toyota automobile,
and to keep in full force and effect the
automobile insurance now in force on said
vehicle until payment for said vehilce [sic]
is completed, which is estimated to be
approximately 3 l/2 years. Further, after
the defendant has completed the payment
on sa1d veh1cle, then he is ordered to pay
the plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month
as child support."
(Decree of DivorceR 17
cf.
Stipulat1on, R-10, ll).
(Emphasis added).
Hrs. Buyers attempted at the Hearing subject of this
appeal, to establish that the 1975 Toyota automobile had
been paid off in April 1978, approximately two years after
the entry of the Decree.
was a lump sum payment.

It was not alleged that there
Rather, an attempt was made to

limit the outstanding automobile principal loan balance
at the date of the Decree, to the $2,587.65.

Thus, by

ammortizing only approximately 60% of the debt at the
rate of $86.36 per month, the

pay-ou~

date was advanced

by one year.
This slight o£
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the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Buyers was that the entire
loan balance was for the Toyota purchase.

His unrebutted

testimony was as follows:
"(Buyers)
In April, I believe, 1975 we purchased a 1975 Toyota Corolla. At that time
we had in our possession a 1974 Dodge Colt
station wagon, which was financed by the Salt
Lake City Firemen's Credit Union.
There was
a balance owing on the 1974 Dodge Colt station
wagon. We traded the Dodge Colt station wagon
in on the Toyota, the 1975 Toyota. 1·/e went
to the Credit Union to get the loan.
They
loaned us the $2,500.00 for the Toyota, plus
they added on the balance owing for the 1974
Dodge Colt.
The purchase price of the Toyota
Corolla was more than $2,500.00.
It was in
fact $3,500.00.
"Q.
(Cutler)
So how much did you owe on this
Toyota, including the debt you had on the Dodge
Colt trade-ln that you retalned and consolldated
in this, as well as the purchase price, as lt
was shown, of $2,500.00 on the Toyota?

"(Buyers)
It seems to me that the total loan
was $4,000.00, at least $4,000.00, because the
purchase price of the car was $3,500.00 for the
1975 Toyota.
"Q.
(Cutler)
And with the interest do
you think it was around $4,000.00?

"A.
(Buyers)
Yes, sir."
R-71).
(Emphasis added).
Thereafter,
La~e

:-:::.

Ci~y

~r.

(R-68, 69; see also

Clinton Barker, the manager of the Salt

Firemen's c~edit Cnion, was called to the stand by

3u:.-,.e::.--s'

c0'..1..'1se:l. <:'.J exa::-~.:.!'le ~is earl:..er ":estimony in light
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he had not used the total purchase price of the Toyota
automobile.

Rather, he had only included the supplemental

loan figure of $2,500.00.

Under examination he admitted

that he was in error and should have used both figures,
stating:
"Q.
(Cutler)
So the total amount that
would have been owed on the Toyota would
have been the 25 ($2,500) plus the 15
($1,500), right, on the car?

(Mr. Barker) " -- the loan was covered by his
shares and his signature and the Toyota.
"Q.
(Cutler)
Right.
But the total amount then
was 25 plus the-rs;-right, on the car?

"A.

(Barker)

Right."

(R-74)

(Emphasis added).

Mr. Barker then, under examination, admitted that
amrnortizing the loan at approximately $86 per month for the
purchase price of the car would take at least three and
one-half years.

He stated:

"Q.
(Cutler)
So that if you applied both
of them (the $1,500 loan for the Dodge tradein on the Toyota and the supplemental loan for
the purchase price of the remaining balance on
the Toyota) at $86.00, that would take it out
about three-and-a-half years to pay them both
off at $86 per month, isn't that correct?

"A.

(Barker)

Probably longer."

(R-75)

Thus, the record is absolutely clear that the appellant,
Hr. Buyers, stipulated and agreed to pay to the plaintiff as
support:
Buyers;

{a)

$86.00 on an automobile awarded to 11rs.

(b) keep the insurance on that automobile;

(c) pay

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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$20.00 per month cash as support, for approximately three
and one-half years it would take to arnrnortize the $4,000
loan for the purchase of that automobile (including the
debt remaining on the "trade-in" used as a down payment
on the Toyota vehicle), and (d) pay sundry debts of the parties.

That Stipulation and Decree embodying that under-

standing was prepared by the respondent's, Mrs. Buyers'
own attorney.

Also, the loan officer testified that it

would take at least three and one-half years at that rate
of payment to amrnortize the loan.
Therefore, there can be no confusion or ambiguity upon
which the Court could possibly find to interpret the previous
Decree to provide for a two

(2) year pay-out rather than the

3 1/2 years agreed between the parties.
There being no ambiguity in the intent of the parties
and the intent of the Court in rendering its Decree of
Divorce Order concerning support, the Lower Court's obligation was to review whether the defendant was in default
under the terms of that Order.

There was no allegation of

a default and no facts presented to support such an assertion.

Mr. Buyers was fully current on his obligation which

by the only evidence in the record would be paid off in May
1979.
It is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court erred
and abused it's discretion in finding that the car loan was,
in fact, paid off in two years and that the defendant owed
an obligation of increased child support retroactive four
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months from the date of the hearing.

Such an Order, in

substance, modified the Decree of Divorce and imposed an
additional obligation of $80.00 per month for a one year
period.

Thus the decision should be overturned.
POINT II

THERE WAS NO ALLEGATION AND NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN
ASSERTION THAT THERE \·lAS A ~ATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE;
THUS, THE COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
As more fully discussed in Point I above,

the decision

of the Court constituted an Amendment of the Decree of
Divorce.

The Amendment, in substance, provided that Mr.

Buyers would be required to pay off the debt owed on the
car awarded to Hrs. Buyers; however, it added the provision
that after two years he would, in addition, be required to
pay $100.00 per month for support, instead of the previous
Order of $20.00 per month.
The laws are so abundantly clear, it hardly requires
recitation.

However, the following cites are given for the

Court's convenient reference which clearly hold that one
District Judge may not overrule another District Judge;
rather, those matters must be appealed.

State v.

~1organ,

527 P2d. 525 (Utah 1974); Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P2d.
821 (Utah 1974); In Re Mecham, 537 P2d. 312.
Further, with reference to Domestic Relations matters,
one Judge may not alter the decision of another, until there
has been demonstrated a substantial material change of
circumstance.

This Court has clearly stated:
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have been adjudicated on the basis of the
facts shown to exist at the time of the
divorce, there can be no jusitifcation
for changing the Decree unless there is
a showing of substantial change in circumstances." Owen v. Owen, 579 P2d. 911 (Utah 1978)
citing Ring v. Rlng, 29 Ut.2d. 436, 511 P2d. 155
(1973).
Such a requirement exists despite the fact that there may
even have been an increase of income as demonstrated in the
Owen case above cited.

Significantly, in the instant action,

there was not even an allegation that any such material
change of circumstance existed.

Further, the Court

specifically failed to make any such Finding.

In fact, there

was no evidence presented to justify any such Finding.

See

Amended Order of the Lower Court, Judge Harding, at R-33-35.
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court
eerred in modifying the Decree of Divorce abasent a showing
and allegation of a material change of circumstance.
POINT III
ANY AMBIGUITIES IN THE CONTRACT STIPULATION AND THE
DECREE SHOULD BE RESOLVED AGAINST THE PARTY WHO DRAFTED IT.
As demonstrated in the Statement of Facts, the appellant,
Mr. Buyers, was not represented by counsel; rather, he
relied on his wife's attorney to memorialize their agreement.
This was done to his satisfaction (as a non-lawyer) and he
executed a Stipulation, upon which the Decree of Divorce was
entered.
The record clearly demonstrates that the respondent
allowed the defendant to rely on the Stipulation and the
Sponsored
by theof
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
digitization provided
by theattempting
Institute of Museum and
Services
Decree
Divorce
forFunding
twoforyears
before
toLibrary
assert
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

that the loan would be paid out in two, rather than three
and one-half years.

This delay was obviously done with the

full knowledge that the total loan would not be ammortized
until approximately May 1979.
The law is clear that any ambiguities in a contract should
be resolved against the party drafting it, particularly where
the drafting party is represented by an attorney and the other
is a lay person.

Guinand v. Walton, 22 Ut.2d. 196, 450 P2d. 467.

Skousen v. Smith, 27 Ut.2d. 169, 493 P2d. 1003 (1972).
Further, it is respectfully submitted that the law is
equally clear that one should not be able to reap the benefits
of a bargain and allow the other party to detrimentally rely
on his agreement and understanding for an excess of two years
and then seek to retroactively modify that agreement and
subject the defendant to substantially increase financial
obligations.

See Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P2d. 695

(Utah 1976).

Hanson v. Beehive Security Co., 14 Ut.2d. 157,

380 P2d. 66, 67 (Ut.l963); Migliaccio v. Davis, 232 P2d. 195,
198 (Ut. 1951).
It is respectfully submitted that any ambiguities in the
agreement or understanding between these parties should be
resolved against the respondent, Mrs. Buyers.

She should be

estopped to deny the pay-out of this loan and the increased
child support should commence in May 1979, not in May 1978.
Thus, the Lower Court's decision should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
There has been no material change of circumstance since
the entry of the Decree.

As such, it cannot be modified by
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Further, the agreement and Stipulation between the
parties, which was prepared by respondent's attorney and
upon which the appellant,

(Mr. Buyers) relied, provided that

he would be given a reduced cash obligation, provided he
paid off an existing loan obligation on a vehicle awarded to
Mrs. Buyers.

The respondent should be estopped to deny the

validity of that agreement.

Further, any ambiguities regarding

the agreement and Order should be strictly construed against
Mrs. Buyers, in that it was prepared by her counsel.
Thus, the Lower Court's decision modifying the Decree
of Divorce should be reversed and the defendant-appellant,
Mr. Buyers,should be awarded his costs and attorney's fees
in prosecuting this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

Roaer F. Cutler, Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
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